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Terrorism
I. Introduction
In recent decades, the global community has been confronted
with the phenomenon of terror as a means of protest. Even though
terrorism is more commonplace in some regions than in others, all
societies have become wary of its devastating impact. The threat
posed by insurgents who seek to radically alter a nations' cultural,
social, and political precepts has proven to be unpredictable, but
efficient policy management can effectively safeguard potential
targets and strengthen vulnerable weaknesses.
The United Kingdom, Israel, and Japan have each developed
terrorism counteraction policies based upon legislation that
specifically targets insurgent operations. While it is important that
these initiatives be liberally construed in order to efficiently police
terrorist behavior, it is equally important that these laws be
narrowly tailored so as to protect individual liberties. Should these
measures invade the sanctity of individual autonomy, terrorists will
be better able to assert the myth that they are liberators of the
oppressed and not violent insurrectionists.
This Comment will discuss different aspects of contemporary
society which function as catalysts for terrorist violence and survey
British, Japanese, and Israeli legislative initiatives that attempt to
control the activities of terrorist organizations that actively operate
in each nation. Part II will focus upon intrinsic obstacles, such as
definitional inconsistencies, threat assessment, and contributing
factors that effective policy management must surmount. Parts III,
IV, and V will survey British, Israeli, and Japanese legislative
countermeasures, respectively, and briefly profile terrorist cells
operating within each nation. Part VI will compare each nation's
initiatives and comment upon the future of terrorism in light of the
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current state of British, Israeli, and Japanese antiterrorism
legislation.
II. Framework for Legislative Control
Before undertaking a study of a particular nation's antiter-
rorism legislation, one should be familiar with several elements that
will have a universal impact upon the effectiveness of such
measures. This section will focus upon general areas that are
significant to any study of terrorism.
It should be recognized that a comprehensive definition of the
term "terrorism" is very elusive. Instead of searching for a catch-
all explanation of the phenomenon, it would be more practical for
a nation to identify terrorism's root causes in order to ascertain a
faction's infrastructure, support bases, and potential targets before
formulating the proper means for response. In this regard,
emphasis should be directed toward distinguishing the contempo-
rary components of society that create an environment conducive
to terrorism.
A. Definitional Obstacles
Establishing a proper and comprehensive definition of
terrorism is a complicated task that still induces extensive debate.
The cliche "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"
illustrates how easily the definition can be obscured.' In western
society, the term elicits graphic and horrid images of criminal
violence and brutality. However, organizations or nations that
actively sponsor or directly engage in terrorism perceive violence
as the most effective means of bringing about the particular
transformations they seek. A complete definition of the term must
take these two opposing viewpoints into account. In this respect,
defining "terrorism" has proven to be troublesome.
Nations such as Japan and Israel have not adopted an explicit
statutory definition of "terrorism," but others, such as the United
1. SEAN ANDERSON & STEPHEN SLOAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
TERRORISM 1 (1995).
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States2 and the United Kingdom,3 have developed such language.4
However, a particular definition will not shape a nation's terrorism
counteraction policy as effectively as will its attitude toward
terrorist violence. The antiterrorism measures of the United
2. U.S. government agencies employ their own definitions that essentially
encompass the basic principles inherent in the American perspective on terrorism:
[T]he unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a
revolutionary organization against individuals or property with
the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or
societies, often for political or ideological purposes. (U.S.
Department of Defense).
[T]he unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives. (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation).
[Piremeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandes-
tine agents. (U.S. Department of State).
[V]iolent criminal conduct apparently intended: (a) to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence the conduct of
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. (U.S.
Department of Justice).
Louis Rend Beres, Note, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and
Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. 239, 240 (1995).
3.' Terrorism is defined as "the use of violence for political ends and includes
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the
public in fear." Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, § 20(1)
(Eng.).
4. Such definitions are still rather simplistic when compared to those of
scholars who seek definitions that encompass all the potential facets of the
insurgent mentality. For example:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent
action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individuals, group or
state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)
from a target population, and serve as message generators.
Threat- and violence-based communication processes between
terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets
are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it
into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or
propaganda is primarily sought.
Alex P. Schmid, The Response Problem as a Definition Problem, in WESTERN
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 7, 8 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds.,
1993).
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Kingdom, Japan, and Israel have been formed by both global
trends and regional factors unique to their individual histories.
When developing future policies, it is not any one particular
definition that will guide these states, but a general attitude shaped
by what each state has learned from experience.
For purposes of this Comment, a strict analysis of the
definition of "terrorism" is unnecessary. The term,. however, does
have important implications that should be noted. For example,
the aforementioned freedom fighter cliche is very misleading.
Terrorists prefer to classify themselves as freedom fighters or
guerrillas struggling for national liberation, social justice, or other
ideals.' In reality, a terrorist often directs violence at persons who
have no connection with his or her alleged grievances.6 People are
often targeted indiscriminately for the mere fact that they are
vulnerable and innocent.7 Genuine freedom fighters generally do
not deliberately attack children, a person passing by in the street,
or people who merely have an ethnic or religious connection to a
geographic area.' True terrorists often target people who are not
the cause of the oppression that a freedom fighter would struggle
against and thus break down the boundaries of acceptable conflict
and draw in a civilian population that is then victimized at
random.9  Terrorists are also not guerrillas. Guerrillas are
irregular soldiers who wage war on far superior military forces, not
unarmed, unsuspecting, and defenseless civilians.1"
Therefore, classifying terrorists as freedom fighters or guerrillas
is a misconception that attempts to refute terrorism's implicit
barbarity and legitimize outlandish criminal behavior. This
manipulation is made possible by broad application of the term
"terrorism." It does not merely apply to radical insurgent organiza-
tions that indiscriminately use violence as an ideological arm;
instead it applies to any individual, group, or nation that utilizes
5. See Ramsey Kleff, Terrorism: The Trinity Perspective, in TERRORISM &
POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CONTROL 13, 13
(Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
6. Benjamin Netanyahu, Defining Terrorism, in TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST
CAN WIN 7, 8 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
7. See Benzion Netanyahu, Terrorists and Freedom Fighters, in TERRORISM:
HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 25, 27 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
8. Id.
9. See Netanyahu, supra note 6, at .9.
10. See id.
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physical force as a medium to invoke or obstruct political and
social transformations. With such an extensive base, it is under-
standable that terrorism has yet to be defined with boilerplate
language. Although a concise or an entirely accurate statement
may prove elusive, terrorism, when broken down to a simple
principle, is basically "the threat of violence and the use of fear to
coerce, persuade, and gain public attention."11
B. Identifying the Threat
Geo-political controversies and ideological disagreements often
serve as catalysts for terrorism. Violence directed against demo-
cratic states frequently results from political and social objectives
that are so hopelessly extreme that the normal channels of
democracy would not be likely to afford the radical results
sought. 2 In non-democratic states, terrorists act out of despera-
tion due to a lack of suitable means to obtain their desired
objectives. 3 Regardless of their theater of operation, terrorist
groups are either reactionaries who wish to restore former
conventions or revolutionaries who wish to replace existing
structures. 14
It is rare for independent terrorist cells to have significant
external contacts for support or an infrastructure that will ensure
their longevity.5 Such organizations are often limited in their
capabilities, but may be able to contact other organizations that can
provide them with necessary aid. 6 Organizations that receive
support from sovereign nations can better maintain the group's
existence through access to training, weapons, safe harbor, and
11. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS AND TERRORISM 3
(1976), cited in ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 3.
12. See LAWRENCE FREEDMAN ET. AL., TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 57 (1986).
13. Id.
14. See John M. Collins, Definitional Aspects, in POLITICAL TERRORISM AND
ENERGY 1, 11-12 (Yonah Alexander & Charles K. Ebinger eds., 1982).
15. KARL A. SEGER, THE ANTI-TERRORISM HANDBOOK 4 (1990).
16. Id. Such an example can be seen with the Japanese Red Army, a small
Marxist organization that is now primarily supported and trained in the Middle
East by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. See U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1994 45 (1995) (hereinafter PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1994).
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logistical and administrative support. 7 Such support provides
them with opportunities to travel internationally, obtain sophistica-
ted weapons and explosives, and coordinate their objectives with
other terrorist groups. 8
Other nations may go so far as to directly organize, supply,
and control terrorist cells for the purpose of creating a militant
wing of a particular autocratic regime." These organizations do
not face difficulties with regard to sustenance, leadership, and
support; however, state-directed organizations are rare due to the
risk of international condemnation.2' Although any insurgent
group, whether independent or state-operated, can be unpredictably
dangerous, overlooking an organization's support base could limit
effective evaluation of its potential capabilities.
The goal of a terrorism counteraction policy is to make the
political, economic, and psychological climate in which terrorists
operate increasingly hostile in order to reduce terrorism to a point
where it cannot divert a nation from its stated policies.2' To
achieve this end, an effective policy should focus upon a rule of law
that delegitimizes terrorist activity. Further, it must make the
practice of supporting terrorism unacceptable internationally in
17. SEGER, supra note 15, at 5. It is often difficult to determine when certain
activities of a state actually support a terrorist organization. See DAVID E. LONG,
THE ANATOMY OF TERRORISM 107 (1990). Sometimes a state will provide
financial support for a political party reputed to have its own terrorist factions.
Id. An example would be Saudi Arabia's support for the PLO through the Al-
Fatah which, although linked with terrorism, is the political wing of the PLO. Id.
An inimical example would be Libya's support of the PLO through splinter groups
that are exclusively committed to terrorist violence. Id.
18. SEGER, supra note 15, at 5. State supported training for terrorist groups
does not always involve military-style camps or drills. Such training can often be
technical in nature, such as surveillance, counterfeiting, forgery, communications,
and recruitment techniques. See LONG, supra note 17, at 108.
19. A striking example of state-directed terrorism occurred in 1984, when Iran
developed a special forces unit comprised of 2500 men, each willing to undertake
suicide missions in order to spread Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Middle
East and North Africa. SEGER, supra note 15, at 5-6. According to former U.S.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Syria, Libya, and North Korea have also been
responsible for state-directed terrorism. See JOHN B. WOLF, ANTITERRORIST
INITIATIVES 24 (1989).
20. It would be more expedient for a state to support, rather than directly
operate a terrorist cell, in order to maintain a questionable distance from the
terrorist act itself. See LONG, supra note 17, at 106.
21. L. Paul Bremer III, The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy, in WESTERN
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 255, 257 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten
eds., 1993).
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
order to stifle financial and military assistance to insurgent
groups.22 Due to each culture's unique ethnocentric differences,
these efforts should focus upon vigorous international cooperation
and negotiation.23 However, rigorous legal standards do not
guarantee compliance, so a nation must also employ localized
measures by continually re-evaluating threats to potential target
sites, and then work to improve their protection.24 Specific
assessments should indicate the potential sources of attack,
motivation, and form of aggression expected.25 Furthermore,
tactical teams are needed to contain and diffuse hostile situations.
Such preventive and reactive measures will supplement the legal
initiatives that a state will employ to effectuate its goals for
countering terrorism.
Without effective implementation, legislative mandates will
only serve as bare and empty attempts at containment. However,
overzealous enforcement may create an oppressive atmosphere,
intrude upon individual liberties, and generate public resentment.
It may then be easier for terrorists to gain sympathy from segments
of a population that are similarly constrained by anti-terrorist
initiatives. This is not to assert, however, that a nation should not
22. The late 1980s provide significant evidence that supports this assertion: the
U.S. air strike on Libya in 1986 reduced the frequency of Libyan involvement in
terrorist activities from 19 acts in 1986 to six in 1988; European Community-
imposed sanctions against Syria led to the 1987 expulsion of Abu Nidal; the
European Community simultaneously recalled its foreign ministers from Tehran
and suspended all official high level exchanges with Iran after Ayatollah
Khomeini's call for the execution of Salman Rushdie. See id. at 258.
23. The Western European community has established the TREVI Group
(Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and Political Violence) which is comprised of
each state's Ministers of Justice and Interior to regularly produce an agreed upon
assessment of terrorist threats facing European Community nations by exchanging
information on the movement and operating methods of particular groups. Id. at
260. Similarly, the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) now alerts
member states of FBI arrest warrants for certain terrorists. Id.
24. This practice needs to be adopted by the government as a whole and by
individual entities in their respective capacities (military installations, defense
contractors, municipal facilities, law enforcement, and the private sector). SEGER,
supra note 15, at 35. Examples can be seen in the universal screening of airline
passengers with metal detectors, increased security at diplomatic facilities, "watch
lists" of terrorists for border police, and covert tactical operations. Bremer, supra
note 21, at 261.
25. G. Davidson-Smith, Counterterrorism Contingency Planning and Incident
Management, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 123,
125 (David A. Charters ed., 1991).
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vehemently denounce terrorism and utilize its best combative
resources. But policy-makers must acknowledge that terrorists
often resort to violence because they feel constrained by the status
quo; further suppression could make violent insurrection more
attractive.
C. Contributing Factors
A nation will need to identify the factors that serve as catalysts
for terrorist violence before it will be able to draft an effective
terrorism counteraction policy. Although democratic states are
frequently targeted for terrorist violence, the inherent strengths of
such political systems make them insusceptible to many forms of
terrorism. The ability to remove leaders through free elections, to
protest freely through the media, and to resolve disputes in
impartial courts reduces the necessity for violent social protest.
26
However, there are also many intrinsic weaknesses in demo-
cratic states that foster the conditions for insurgencies. The
democratic right to freedom of association provides terrorists with
more latitude than that allowed by authoritarian states.27 Inade-
quately protected targets, such as mass transit systems, are
abundant and readily accessible, and the legal system can be
inhibited by witness intimidation and the requirement of strict
proof for conviction.2"
The dilemma which democratic states face is that the only way
to address such contributing factors is to curtail the freedoms
inherent in their very existence.29
Terrorists seek to turn a nation's power and strength against
itself by exploiting the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of its
26. Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism and Democracy, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM 14, 17 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinstein, eds., 1993). These
factors will not reduce terrorism if they fail to work properly. Id. Terrorist
violence incensed in Northern Ireland and in Sri Lanka when free elections were
stifled through the gerrymandering of election districts. Id. Unrestrained police
brutality has also provided for a recourse to violence as exemplified by an
unpunished police killing of a West Berlin demonstrator which gave rise to the
German June 2nd movement of 1967. Id. Another contributing element occurs
when the media cannot vent the grievances of the public, such as in the Basque
country under the Franco Regime in Spain. Id.
27. Id. at 18-19.
28. Schmid, supra note 26, at 18-19.
29. Id. at 15.
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infrastructure; 3° but an attack will need publicity before it can
trigger political or social transformations in the targeted culture.
In this respect, targets are chosen for symbolic purposes and attacks
are deliberately threatening and violent.31 With the capabilities of
the modern media, the old Chinese proverb "kill one and frighten
ten thousand" could now read "kill one and frighten ten mil-
lion., 32 The commercialization of violence has provoked increas-
ingly spectacular operations in order to avoid monotony.33  In
order to transmit a more staggering psychological message,
symbolism has taken precedence over substance with regard to
target selection.34  Nations such as the United Kingdom have
realized the influential role of the media and have slowly enacted
censorship laws to control the messages being broadcast.
35
Without such restrictions, the media can unwittingly contribute to
the success of an operation.36
Another catalyst for terrorist violence is an intensified freedom
of movement that has developed on an enormous scale.37 Access
to mass transportation allows international terrorist organizations
to strike at targets anywhere in the world by planting bombs and
fleeing the area before detonation.38 Modern superhighways and
easy access to air travel have enabled domestic terrorists to
30.. ROBERT H. KUPPERMAN & DARRELL M. TRENT, TERRORISM: THREAT,
REALITY, RESPONSE 13 (1979).
31. Ninety-five percent of terrorist violence involves bombings, assassinations,
armed assaults, kidnappings, hijackings, and hostage-taking, half of which are
directed against American, French, Israeli, British, and Turkish targets. See
Jeffrey Ian Ross, The Nature of Contemporary International Terrorism, in
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 17, 31-32 (David A.
Charters ed., 1991).
32. SEGER, supra note 15, at 15. While a terrorist bombing that killed the
governor of Idaho in 1905 took days to reach the world audience, a 1986 hijacking
of a Karachi airliner was broadcast live on the morning news. Id.
33. Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank, Political Terrorism and Political
Development, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS AND POSSIBILI-
TIES OF LEGAL CONTROL 29-30 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
34. See Collins, supra note 14, at 12.
35. See generally CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN
BRITISH LAW 267-72, (2d ed. 1992).
36. In 1985, the press paid up to $12,500 for interviews with the Amal Militia
during its hijacking of TWA 847. See JAMES ADAMS, THE FINANCING OF
TERROR (1986), reprinted in SEGER, supra note 15, at 15.
37. See Schmid, supra note 26, at 18.
38. See SEGER, supra note 15, at 16.
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effectuate their plans with less chance of detection.39 The volume
of tourism and international migration in Western Europe is so
enormous that keeping cross-border traffic under surveillance is
beyond systematic control.40 Restricting the ability to move freely
throughout certain nations will generate disdain among many
critics, but may be an unfortunate necessity for certain terrorism
counteraction initiatives.
The differences between Western and non-Western perspec-
tives on collective responsibility have also had a significant impact
on terrorist violence. Western societies usually emphasize
individual accountability and responsibility, while non-Western
societies tend to hold all members of a social, ethnic, or religious
group collectively responsible for assigned guilt.41  As a result,
non-Western insurgents will often target an entire group or
culture.42  Western insurgents, however, will target particular
individuals, such as businessmen and politicians, more often than
random passers-by.43
The contemporary international community has also been
influenced by a century of political, social, and religious movements
that each espouse distinct ideologies and seek different transmuta-
tions. Due to the great diversity of terrorist groups, a regular
scheme of comparative analysis must take into account distinct
political beliefs, unique organizational features, motivations, and
tactics of a group." A terrorist's ideology and ultimate goal have
significant relationships to his or her strategies and operations.
4 5
39. Modem transportation systems enabled members of the United Freedom
Front to live in Ohio and travel to New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts to rob banks, collect intelligence, and bomb targets. Id. These
terrorists would leave on Monday morning and return undetected by Friday. Id.
Members of the Brotherhood of Silence used vans and motor homes as safe houses
and would travel U.S. interstate highways until a deadly confrontation with the
authorities revealed a mobile arsenal of weapons, scanners, and tactical equipment.
Id.
40. In 1987 alone, the Dutch borders were crossed by 30,000 trains, 229,000
aircraft, and 232,000 ships. VOLKSKRANT, July 12, 1988, at 1, cited in Schmid,
supra note 26, at 14. Custom points were crossed by 114,000,000 people and
almost 4000 weapons were confiscated. Id.
41. Id. at 31.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 16.
45. Bard E. O'Neill cites to the following seven basic types of strategic
ideologies that have been adopted by terrorist groups over the century: 1)
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Fundamentalist religions often perceive terrorist violence as a
divine duty which ultimately relieves insurgents of the moral,
political, and practical constraints that normally condemn indiscri-
minate and massive violence.46 One terrorist may seek to com-
pletely obliterate a nation's government 47 whereas another may
want only to change a particular practice rather than abolish an
entire system.48 Furthermore, a governing body itself may engage
in terrorism in order to deter and weaken opposition.49 As can be
seen, the subjective factors that contribute to the identity of a
terrorist cell vary greatly.
Anarchists are the most dangerous because they believe that all institutionalized
political systems are illegitimate and should be eliminated; 2) Egalitarians seek to
radically transform the social structure through a redistribution of equality and
often advocate authoritarian and elitist regimes; 3) Traditionalists want to restore
past systems and conventions based on ancestral heritage and religion; 4) Pluralists
want to establish a system in which values of individual freedom, liberty, and
participation will be emphasized, however there are few examples of such groups;
5) Secessionists renounce the nation state to which they are subjects and want to
separate and establish an independent state; 6) Reformists aim to obtain more
political, social and economic benefits for the people whom they claim to
represent, but do not want to reject the current political system; and finally, 7)
Preservationists seek to maintain the status quo by engaging in violence against
non-ruling minorities. See Bard E. O'Neill, The Strategic Context of Insurgent
Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES
OF LEGAL CONTROL 77-79 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
46. See Weinberg & Eubank, supra note 33, at 30.
47. Richard Schultz, Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology, in
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CURRENT RESEARCH AND DIRECTIONS 9-15 (Alan
D. Buckley & Daniel D. Olson eds., 1980) noted in ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra
note 1, at 5. "Revolutionary Terrorism [is defined as] ... the threat and/or
development of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with
the object of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change (i.e., a change
of fundamental political-social processes) within the political system." Id.
48. Id. "Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism [is defined as] ... the threat and/or
employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with
the objective of effecting various changes in the particular political system ....
The goal is to bring about certain changes in the body politic, not to abolish it in
favor of a complete system change." Id.
49. Id. "Establishment Terrorism [is defined as] ... the threat and/or
employment of extranormal forms of political violence in varying degrees, by an
established political system, against both external and internal opposition. Id.
Specifically such means may be employed by an established political system against
other nation-states and groups external to the particular political system, as well
as internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or to move
the populace to comply with programs/goals of the state." Schultz, supra note 47,
at 5.
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It should be realized that there is no concrete remedy that will
entirely eradicate terrorism. The preceding discussion regarding
contributing factors is a general survey of major contemporary
trends, not a standard that will envelop each root cause. However,
if these factors go unrestrained, they will serve as a conduit for
terrorist violence. Policy-makers must recognize the aforemen-
tioned factors in order to avoid overrating or underrating the threat
of terrorism. There is a danger that a nation will unknowingly
effectuate the fundamental goals of a terrorist movement by
devising unnecessary initiatives that counter misperceived threats,
and thereby alter the status quo."
II. United Kingdom
Antiterrorism legislation in the United Kingdom has been
greatly, if not entirely, influenced by the ongoing controversy in
Northern Ireland between the Catholic and Protestant popula-
tions. 1 The ramifications of the political violence inherent in the
struggle are staggering: among a population of 1.5 million, 3000
people have been killed since 1969.52 In addition, although this
50. See generally Grant Wardlaw, The Democratic Framework, in THE
DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM 5-11 (David A. Charters ed., 1994).
51. The underlying conflict that plagues Northern Ireland can be traced back
as early as the 1600s. See JOHN E. FINN, CONSTIrUTIONS IN CRISIS 47 (1991).
Protestant British and Scottish colonists forcibly settled Ulster Plantation amidst
Catholic uprisings. Id. The conflict later solidified when King William's
Protestant army defeated King James' Catholic army in 1689. Id. In the ensuing
centuries, severe prejudices developed between the Catholic and Protestant
populations, the former demanding the establishment of an independent Irish
state, the latter remaining loyal to the crown. Id. The demands for some form of
national political independence were satisfied by the foundation of the Irish Free
State in 1922. Id. However, this settlement left Northern Ireland, as formed
under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, subservient to the British and in the
control of the Loyalist Protestant majority. Id.
52. David Bonner, The United Kingdom's Response to Terrorism, in WESTERN
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 174 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Chelinsten eds.,
1993). The 1960s gave rise to a civil rights movement calling for reforms that
would allow the Catholic minority to participate equally in the political and
economic life of the province. See Brian J. Dorrian, Note, Meeting "Clear and
Present Dangers?" British Legal Responses to Violent Irish Nationalism 50 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 161, 163 (1993). The 1963 election of a moderate leader,
Terrence O'Neill, significantly contributed to the progress of the civil rights
movement and raised Catholic expectations, but also alienated the loyalist
population. Id. The escalating violence culminated when the mainly Protestant
police force opened fire on Catholic rioters in 1969. Id. Two nights of violent
rioting ensued, and the British Army was subsequently summoned. Id.
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Comment focuses mainly upon Irish-based terrorism in the United
Kingdom, the United Kingdom has experienced domestic terrorism
from other sources and has also been repeatedly victimized by
foreign insurgents.53 However, it is violent Irish nationalism that
has had the most severe impact upon British antiterrorist legisla-
tion.
A. Insurgent Organizations
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was established in the mid-
19th century, but did not become so titled until the Dublin Easter
Rebellion of 1916."4 The IRA was disbanded upon the creation
of the Irish Free State in 1922, but again became active in 1939
when it undertook a bombing campaign in London, Manchester,
Glasgow, and Birmingham.55
In 1969, internal disagreements over the group's Marxist
ideology caused a split in the IRA. 6 One faction became the
Official Irish Republican Army which renounced armed struggle in
1972, and eventually became the Worker's Party.57 Although the
Official Irish Republican Army has ceased using force and has
developed a non-sectarian political approach to assert its views, it
remains a proscribed organization in the United Kingdom.58
The other faction formed the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA)59 in order to pursue the objectives of unifying
53. Great Britain has witnessed the hijacking and destruction of its aircraft
abroad, the kidnapping and killing of its nationals abroad, as well as bombings,
assassinations and attempted assassinations within its borders by foreign insurgents.
Id. at 173. Terrorist incidents have surfaced in connection with the political affairs
of India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. Id. The British Isles have also seen
domestic violence perpetrated by Welsh and Scottish nationalists, neo-Fascists,
radical animal rights activists, and Anarchists such as the Angry Brigade. Id.
54. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 148.
55. Id. Due to this resurgence of violence, both the United Kingdom and
Ireland officially proscribed the IRA. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Bonner, supra note 52, at 175.
59. PIRA is the main Irish nationalist paramilitary and terrorist organization
seeking to reunite the six counties of Northern Ireland with the rest of Ireland in
order to form an "Irish Socialist Republic." ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1,
at 292. This objective is sought primarily through revolutionary armed struggle
rather than through political or diplomatic means. Id. PIRA has resorted to
terrorism aimed at inflicting maximum casualties and has targeted civilians as well
as military personnel. Id.
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Ireland under a socialist government and undermining British
support for keeping Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom
through military operations.6° PIRA's terrorist campaign consists
of bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies
targeted against the British Army, Ulster security forces, prison and
judicial officials, and Loyalist party members. 61 The objectives of
PIRA's campaign are to raise to unacceptable levels the economic
and political costs to Britain of maintaining troops in Northern
Ireland, to provoke British and Northern Irish military and police
forces to violate the human and civil rights of PIRA suspects or
ordinary Catholics in the hope that such abuses will outrage
Britain's domestic civil libertarians and excite international
condemnation, and to forcibly mobilize Northern Irish Catholics
into the struggle.62  Financing has been generated through not
only robberies of banks, post offices, and corporate payrolls,63 but
also through extortion, profits from small businesses, and defraud-
ing the government.6 Additionally, PIRA has been able to draw
support from Irish Americans and Libya in the form of arms and
money.
65
60. See id. PIRA has also used its political wing-the Provisional Sinn Fein
headed by Gerry Adams-to accomplish such goals. Bonner, supra note 52, at
175. PIRA had as many as 1000 hard-core members in the 1970s, but internal
disputes have since cut this figure to between 200 and 500 members. Id. Even
though membership appears to be small, PIRA is able to draw upon much support
through sympathy and intimidation. Id.
61. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 294. From 1969 to 1982, members
of PIRA have been convicted of 2269 murders, 7521 bombings resulting in 608
deaths, and at least 1000 "kneecappings" (summary executions and threats against
family members). Id. PIRA is compartmentalized into Active Service Units
whose members only know each other and the person issuing orders from above
so as to minimize damages should a member be caught. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES 56-59 (1988) (hereinafter TERRORIST
GROUP PROFILES). The Active Service Units are subordinate to localized
Brigades which are ultimately responsible to the PIRA operational authority, the
Northern Command. Id. PIRA attacks have occurred outside of Northern
Ireland, the most notorious being the Brighton Bombing of 1984 which was
designed to kill Margaret Thatcher. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 295.
PIRA operations have also been reported in western European nations such as
West Germany and the Netherlands. Id. at 294.
62. Id. at 293-94.
63. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 57.
64. Bonner, supra note 52, at 175.
65. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 57. Libyan weapons were
intercepted off the coasts of Ireland in 1973 and France in 1987. Id. Libya has
also been reported to have given PIRA between one and two million British
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A smaller Marxist group, the Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA), was formed by dissidents of the Official IRA in 1975 and
is considered to be the military arm of the Irish Republican
Socialist Party, even though the party denies such a connection.66
Feuding between the INLA and both wings of the IRA led to the
murders of many members, including the group's founder, Seamus
Costello.67 In addition, subsequent internal fighting and arrests
triggered by informants have severely weakened the group.
6
INLA attacks began in 1975 with shootings and bombings of British
soldiers, Northern Ireland's security forces, Ulster government
officials, and members of the Loyalist Party.69 However, INLA
received the most attention with the assassination of the British
Conservative Party spokesman in 1979.70 The group does not
have international financial support and relies mainly on robberies
of banks, trains, and payrolls for funding.71 However, INLA has
made contacts with the West German Revolutionary Cells and
French Direct Action Leftist groups.
72
Although terrorism within the United Kingdom is traditionally
presumed to be executed only by Irish Catholics, Protestant cells
have also been instrumental in shaping legislative responses.
Loyalist terrorism has been limited to small groups that condemn
links with the Irish Republic and resist political change.73
The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was formed in 1971
for the ostensible purpose of protecting Protestant neighborhoods
from IRA attacks, but it is suspected of supporting smaller death
squad units that assume names separate from the UDA.74 The
UDA receives effective state support from the Ulster Defense
Regiment, which is an official security organization dominated by
sectarian Protestant militiamen, and which continues to hold legal
existence in Northern Ireland.75
pounds. Id.
66. Id. at 50.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 51-52.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 51.
72. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 147.
73. Bonner, supra note 52, at 177.
74. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 357.
75. Id. The UDA's legal status is due in large part to the fact that British
security forces depend upon it for auxiliary support. Id.
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The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) is a proscribed group that
was briefly political in the 1970s, but is mainly known for bomb-
ings, robberies, and murdering members of the Catholic communi-
ty.76 It was formed from the unification of all Ulster Protestant
militias in 1913 in order to oppose the grant of an autonomous
government to Ireland in which Protestants would have formed a
minority. 7  This group also had effective state support from the
Ulster Defense Regiment.7 8
The Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), which is basically a
"counter terror" body that resists Catholic aggression and seeks to
deteriorate the connection with the British government in order to
establish an independent Northern Ireland.79 The UFF splintered
from the Ulster Defense Association and was proscribed in 1973,
but continued to carry out numerous assassinations and bomb-
ings." Although its targets have been IRA supporters and
sympathizers, it has also carried out random attacks on prominent
Catholics regardless of political affiliation in order to terrorize the
Roman Catholic Community.81
B. Antiterrorism Legislation
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 2
(PTA) is the current product of the British legislative response to
terrorism. A barrage of violent Irish nationalism between 1972 and
1974 led to the somewhat hasty enactment of this initiative.83 The
76. Id.
77. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 359. The UVF ceased to exist
officially in 1922 when most of its members joined the newly created Royal Ulster
Constabulary. Id. However, the group reinstated itself in both 1966 and 1973 and
declared war on all IRA members. Id.
78. Id.
79. Bonner, supra note 52, at 177.
80. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 359.
81. Id. In one of its more notorious attacks, the UFF shot and wounded
current Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams as he was driving through Belfast. Id.
82. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Eng.).
83. See WALKER, supra note 35, at 31. The Birmingham bombings of
November 21, 1974, in which twenty-one people were killed and 184 injured, are
often thought to have prompted the passage of the PTA. Id. However, both the
Provisional and Official IRA had engaged in over 150 attacks in the two years
preceding the PTA's creation. Id. Although the PTA has been deemed "panic
legislation," it was modeled after the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1973, the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, and the
Immigration Act of 1971. Id. at 31-32. Nevertheless, the PTA is criticized because
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PTA has been renewed and amended since its enactment in 1974
with the most recent alteration taking effect in 1989. Emergency
legislation specific to Northern Ireland has also been enacted with
the passage of The Northern Ireland Emergency Provision Act
84
(EPA). The most current revision was completed on June 17, 1996,
and went into effect on August 25, 1996.85 Critics point out that
these two initiatives overlap both each other8 6 and the common
law.87  Notwithstanding such criticism, both Acts remain at the
forefront of British legislative responses to both domestic and
international terrorism.
The EPA focuses on a system of scheduled offenses considered
to be commonly committed in pursuit of terrorist activities and as
such are given special treatment as to the mode of commitment,
trial, and sentencing.88 , Some of these offenses can be certified out
of EPA treatment and addressed in the normal manner if the
Attorney General agrees that the commission of a particular
offense has no connection with the purposes of the EPA.89 Under
the PTA, if a person is connected with the commission of a
terrorist activity, the Secretary of State is granted the power to
issue exclusion orders against him or her.9" Such orders can
of the design defects that stem from its rapid passage.
84. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 (Eng.).
85. An official review of the 1991 revision of the legislation recommended that
a new statute be enacted with a number of changes. See generally J.J. ROWE,
REVIEW OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT 1991,
Q.C., Cm.2706 (Feb 1995) (the Rowe Report) as cited in Kersi B. Shroff, The
-United Kingdom, in TERRORISM: FOREIGN/INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES
IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES 122 (Report for Congress, 1995) (analyzes the
1991 form of the EPA, but remains consistent with the 1996 revision).
86. WALKER, supra note 35, at 41.
87. See Bruce W. Warner, Great Britain and the Response to International
Terrorism, in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM 20 (David A. Charters ed., 1994).
88. Shroff, supra note 85, at 124. Schedule 1, Part I, of the EPA lists
substantive offenses such as murder, manslaughter, rioting, kidnapping, false
imprisonment, conspiracy to murder, causing explosions, escaping from lawful
custody, theft, robbery, burglary, intimidation, throwing a petrol bomb, criminal
damage to property, possession of illegal firearms, aircraft hijacking, taking of
hostages, financial assistance to terrorism, and breach of exclusion orders. Id.
89. Id. at 124. Murder, manslaughter, theft, and intimidation can be certified
out whereas rioting, causing grievous bodily harm by explosions and escaping from
lawful custody cannot. See also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1996, Sch. 1, Pt. 1: Substantive Offenses (Eng.).
90. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, §§ 4-8, Sched.
2, (Eng.).
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exclude a person from entering either Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, or the entire United Kingdom.91
The EPA proscribes ten paramilitary organizations9 2 and the
PTA proscribes two organizations.93 In this respect, the media has
been prohibited from broadcasting words spoken by representatives
of proscribed organizations, or any statements supporting pro-
91. Id. An order lasts for three years but can be revoked by the Secretary of
State before the period expires. Id. at Sched. 2(1) and (2). A British citizen
cannot be excluded from the entire United Kingdom. Id. at § 7(4). A British
citizen also cannot be excluded from Great Britain if he or she has been a resident
of Great Britain throughout the last three years and is currently excluded from
Northern Ireland. Id. at § 5(4)(a) and (b). Likewise, a British citizen cannot be
excluded from Northern Ireland if he or she has been a resident of Northern
Ireland throughout the last three years and is currently excluded from Great
Britain. Id. at § 6(4)(a) and (b). Exclusion orders are used when there is
sufficient information that indicates that an individual is involved with terrorism
but where that individual cannot be prosecuted because of a lack of admissible
evidence. See ROWE, supra note 85, at 6. Sixty-five people have been excluded
from the entire United Kingdom, 410 from Great Britain, and seven from
Northern Ireland. See C.A. GEARTY & J.A. KIMBELL, TERRORISM AND THE
RULE OF LAW 34 (1995) as cited in Shroff, supra note 85, at 129.
92. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, Sched. 2.
Organizations proscribed by the EPA are the Irish Republican Army, Red Hand
Commandos, Cumann na mBan, Fianna Na mBan, Saor Eire, Ulster Freedom
Fighters, Ulster Volunteer Force, Irish National Liberation Army, Irish People's
Liberation Organization, and the Ulster Defence Force. Id. at § 30(3). The
Secretary of State may add or remove organizations from this list. Id. at § 30(4).
When an organization is listed, it becomes illegal for any person to: a) belong to
the organization; b) solicit support for the organization; c) solicit membership or
carry out orders of the organization; d) address any meeting of three or more
persons knowing that the meeting is to: i) support a proscribed organization; ii)
further the activities of a proscribed organization; or iii) be addressed by a
member of a proscribed organization. Id. at § 30(1)(a)-(d). It is also illegal to
publicly wear any item of dress or display any article that arouses reasonable
apprehension that he or she is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization
(Id. at § 31(a) and (b)) or to publicly conceal one's identity with a mask or a hood.
Id. at § 35. Furthermore, it is an offense to possess any article that could'
reasonably be assumed to be connected with the commission, preparation, or
instigation of an act of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.
Id. at § 32(1).
93. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Sched. 1
(Eng.). The PTA has only proscribed the Irish Republican Army (no specification
is made between the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA) and the Irish National
Liberation Army. See id. The language of PTA § 2, relating to membership,
support, and meetings of proscribed organizations, and PTA § 3, relating to the
display of public support, mirrors the language of EPA §§ 30 and 32. However,
no provisions of the PTA address the wearing of masks or hoods to conceal one's
identity.
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scribed organizations.94 However, the British government has
appeased the media by ensuring the availability of official sources
of information.95
The EPA also subjects private security services in Northern
Ireland to intense scrutiny in order to prevent terrorist infiltration
of such enterprises in order to extort funds from the public.96 A
constable is authorized to enter any premises where a business
involving the provision of security services is operated and inspect
employment records.97 Any person who knowingly or recklessly
furnishes false or misleading information during the certification
process commits an offense.98
The EPA grants the police and armed forces broad powers of
search, arrest, and detention which can be exercised without a
warrant or reasonable suspicion.99 Although the EPA gives
similar authority to both constables and the army, any member of
the armed forces on duty may detain suspected offenders for a
maximum of only four hours."t The PTA also grants broad
94. See generally WALKER, supra note 35, at 267-78.
95. Shroff, supra note 85, at 132.
96. Id. at 127; see also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996,
Part V: Regulation of the Provision of Private Security Services (§§ 37-44) (Eng.).
97. Shroff, supra note 85, at 127. The EPA requires a certification process for
private security services through which certificates must be renewed every 12
months (see Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, § 39(3) (Eng.))
and a certificate holder must notify the Secretary of State of a change of
employees within 14 days of the change. See id. at § 40. The Secretary of State
may refuse to issue a certificate or revoke an existing certificate if he has reason
to believe that a proscribed organization would benefit from the certificate or if
the applicant or certificate holder has persistently failed to comply with the
requirements of Part V (Regulation of the Provision of Private Security Forces).
See id. at § 39(1) and (5).
98. Shroff, supra note 85, at 127; see also Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 1996, § 38(2), (Eng.).
99. Shroff, supra note 85, at 123. For example, both the police and armed
forces may: 1) enter and search buildings, other than a dwelling house and seize
any munitions or radio transmitters and receivers found therein; 2) stop and search
persons in public places and seize any munitions or radio transmitters and
receivers; 3) enter a non-dwelling building to search for and seize explosives; 4)
stop and search persons in public places and seize explosives; 5) enter any
premises to search for detained persons; 6) stop and question a person anywhere
to ascertain identity, movements or knowledge of terrorist incidents; and, 7) enter
any premises in the course of operations for preservation of peace or maintenance
of order. Id.; see also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, §§ 17-24
(Eng.).
100. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, § 19 (Eng.)
(Powers of arrest and seizure by members of Her Majesty's forces).
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investigatory powers to the British police Over the commission,
preparation, instigation, or financing of terrorism.0 1 For exam-
ple, if a constable has reasonable suspicion that a person is simply
connected with terrorist activity, the constable may arrest him or
her without a warrant even though the person is not suspected of
committing a specific crime."°  Additionally, the PTA allows
immigration and customs officials to examine and search persons
and articles to determine if they are connected to terrorist
activity. 3 Although the authorities are granted sweeping powers
of arrest and detention under the EPA, evidence of admissions and
confessions will not be admitted into court if there is unchallenged
evidence of torture, inhumane treatment, violence, or threats of
violence used to coerce a suspect into making a statement.1°4
The EPA establishes two forms of committal proceedings in
Northern Ireland: a preliminary investigation in which the testi-
mony of prosecution witnesses is obtained by the court under oath,
and a preliminary inquiry in which written depositions are consi-
101. Shroff, supra note 85, at 130. A person is guilty of an offense if he or she:
a) discloses to another person information that is likely to prejudice an investiga-
tion; b) falsifies, conceals, destroys or otherwise disposes of, or causes or permits
the falsification, concealment, destruction or disposal of, material which is or is
likely to be relevant to an investigation. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989, § 17(2) (Eng.). An exception is made for disclosures by a
legal adviser to a client or representative of a client or to any person in
contemplation of or in connection with legal proceedings. Id. at § 2C.
102. Shroff, supra note 85, at 130. Such a person may be detained for up to 48
hours, which may be extended for an additional five days with, the permission of
the Secretary of State. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 1989,
§ 14(4) and (5) (Eng.); see also R. v. Officer in Charge of Police Office,
Castlereagh, ex parte Lynch, [1980] N.I. 126, 131, as cited in Shroff, supra note 85,
at 130.
103. Shroff, supra note 85, at 130. Immigration and customs officials may arrest
a person without reasonable suspicion and subsequently detain him or her for up
to 12 hours, which may be extended to 48 hours if there is reasonable suspicion.
Id. Detention may also be extended for an additional five days with the
permission of the Secretary of State. Id.; see Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989, § 16 and Sched. 5, § l(b) and (c) (Eng.).
104. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 § 12(2)(b) (Eng.).
After 1981, a number of trials were based on evidence obtained from accomplices
turned informers under the promise of immunity ("Supergrasses"). See S.H.
BAILEY, ET AL, CIVIL LIBERTIES 263 (1991) as cited in Shroff, supra note 85, at
126. Such trials were abandoned in 1986 when it was noted that judges were not
sufficiently discriminating in the use of uncorroborated evidence. Id.
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dered by the court. °5 A person accused of a scheduled offense
may only be granted bail by a judge of the High Court or the
Court of Appeal,1" but a magistrate may remand such an offen-
der into custody for a maximum of 28 days.' °7 Scheduled offen-
ses are tried before a judge sitting without a jury to prevent the
intimidation of witnesses and jurors."l8 However, the judge must
give reasons for a conviction and a defendant is given a right of
appeal on any ground without the leave of court or a certificate
from the trial court judge."
The PTA also criminalizes financial assistance to acts of
terrorism or proscribed organizations.11 The PTA absolves
bankers and financial advisors from breaching any rules of
confidence in order to encourage voluntary disclosure of any
information based upon suspicion of funds being used to finance
activities connected with terrorism.' In this respect, it is an
offense to fail to disclose knowledge or suspicion of financial
assistance of terrorism gained within the course of business
105. Shroff, supra note 85, at 124. The latter proceeding requires the consent
of both the court and the defendant. Id. Because defendants would often
withhold their consent by refusing to recognize the court, a provision was enacted
whereby the court is obliged to proceed, if it is not unjust to do so, without the
defendant's consent if the prosecution wishes to conduct a preliminary inquiry for
a scheduled offense. Id.; see also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1996, § 2 (Eng.).
106. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, § 3(2) (Eng.).
Magistrates are no longer used for bail hearings in terrorist cases because it was
the practice of the defendant's supporters to mob the courtroom and create a
threatening atmosphere and subsequently intimidate the court. See ROWE, supra
note 85, at 12.
107. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, § 5 (Eng.).
108. See id. at § 11; Shroff, supra note 85, at 124. Critics of this system argue
that a judge will become biased against defendants after continually reviewing
cruel and horrifying evidence. See GEARTY & KIMBELL, supra note 91, at 51.
Statistics since 1980 show acquittal rates ranging from 29% to 50%. Id. However,
the latest review of this provision found that intimidation still poses a threat to
jury trials and that the current system should not yet be abandoned. See ROWE,
supra note 85, at 15.
109. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, § 11(5) and (6) (Eng.).
110. See generally Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989,
§§ 9-13 (Eng.). These provisions are not applicable to acts committed outside the
United Kingdom unless the omission of such acts would constitute a triable offense
in the United Kingdom. Id. at § 9(4).
111. Shroff, supra note 85, at 130.
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dealings."2 Furthermore, the EPA has provisions that allow for
the confiscation of proceeds of terrorist activities."'
Although the PTA does not apply to offenses committed
outside of the United Kingdom, section 4 of the Suppression of
Terrorism Act of 1978 grants jurisdiction over offenses committed
in countries that are members of the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism.14 Jurisdiction is also granted over
activities related to aviation and maritime security" 5 and the
taking of hostages." 6
C. Observations
The United Kingdom has uniformly addressed terrorism under
initiatives designed to control the domestic struggle in Northern
Ireland. The PTA may have been frantically enacted under the
duress of a seemingly uncontrollable IRA bombing campaign of the
early 1970s, but it has also been molded into a powerful declaration
of the United Kingdom's antiterrorist policy. Similar to the EPA,
the PTA is a temporary measure that may one day be repealed
entirely. As the United Kingdom attempts to mend its domestic
troubles in the future, it will become necessary for the British
Government to determine when to retire its temporary antiterror-
ism legislation altogether. But in the wake of developments of the
past century, total abandonment of the Acts could prove unwise
and a permanent legislative policy may better serve the interests of
the United Kingdom.
112. See generally Criminal Justice Act, 1993, § 51 (Eng.), as cited in Shroff,
supra note 85, at 130.
113. Shroff, supra note 85, at 127. If a conviction is obtained for intimidation,
financial assistance for terrorism, or assisting another to retain the proceeds of
terrorist-related activities, the court may also issue a confiscation order. Id. at 128.
The court is allowed to assume that any property transferred to the defendant in
the six years prior to the proceedings was the result of terrorist-related activities.
Id.
114. Id. at 131. Such offenses "include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
abduction, causing explosions with intent to endanger life or property, and
possessing firearms with an intent to injure." Id.
115. Aviation Security Act, 1982 (Eng.); Aviation and Maritime Security Act,
1990 (Eng.), as cited in Shroff, supra note 85, at 131.
116. Taking of Hostages Act, 1982, § 4 (Eng.) as cited in Shroff, supra note 85,
at 131. Also, the Internationally Protected Persons Act of 1978 grants extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over offenses committed against diplomats and government
officials. Id.
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The United Kingdom faces a unique problem in that it must
cope with terrorism in essentially two environments. Great Britain
has suffered through significant insurgencies, especially those which
gave rise to the PTA, but on a scale quite different from that of
Northern Ireland. With regard to Northern Ireland, the scars left
by centuries of religious discrimination will not be healed by a
withdrawal of the British military. There are no legislative
initiatives that will be able to reverse the extreme bitterness and
hatred between Catholics and Protestants. Furthermore, the
presence of heavily armed British soldiers in Northern Ireland over
the past two decades has not contributed to the development of a
society in which political and social grievances are to be remedied
through non-violent processes. The EPA constitutes perhaps the
most efficient policy of countering violence that one can expect to
be implemented in such an environment. But as its title states, the
EPA is an emergency provision and not permanent. One hopes
that the emergencies that have necessitated the implementation of
the EPA will not only subside in the coming century, but serve as
examples of what the people of Northern Ireland must work to
avoid in the future.
IV. Israel
Similar to the United Kingdom, Israel's antiterrorism legisla-
tion has been shaped by internal threats resulting from centuries of
conflict between Jews and Palestinians."7 The fall of the Otto-
man Empire on the eve of World War I gave rise to zealous
117. This conflict is grounded in the Biblical histories of Canaan (now Israel)
and the Hebrew exodus from Egypt in the thirteenth century B.C. See FEDERAL
RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY 6, 17
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1990) (hereinafter ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY). The
Palestinians (the Biblical Philistines) began their military push into Canaan around
1050 B.C., but were repelled by an increasingly powerful Israelite army comman-
ded by King David. Id. However, in the sixth century B.C., the Babylonians
conquered Jerusalem, thereupon scattering the Hebrew people into exile. Id. The
Persian defeat of Babylonia in the mid-sixth century B.C. enabled the Jews to
return to Israel, but the Roman Empire, upon conquering the Persians enveloped
Israel in 332 B.C. Id. The Arab-Muslim conquest of 638 A.D. ended the rule of
the Roman Empire, and the region, now Palestine, was subjected to Arab rule
until Western Europe launched the Crusades of 1100 A.D. Id. The Arabs again
took control of Jerusalem in 1291 A.D. Id. In 1516, the region was incorporated
into the Ottoman Empire which remained in power until World War I. Id.
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Palestinian and Zionist independence movements,n s both of
which were further fueled by the rule of the British Mandate.
119
Israel officially came into being on May 14, 1948, and was immedi-
ately declared war upon by the Arab League." ° An armistice
was agreed upon the following year,12 ' but major wars again
erupted in 1956-57,1" 1967," 1969-70,124 1973,'25 and
1982.126 These intense conflicts led to the Israeli antiterrorism
measures in place today.
Palestinian terrorists generally seek to eradicate Israeli society
as a whole rather than merely a single political entity or elite. 27
In this respect, Arab states are able to work against Israel, without
118. See ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 117, at 17-38.
119. See id. at 38-44. The founding of the World Zionist movement took place
in the late nineteenth century and contributed to increased Jewish immigration to
Palestine. Id. Following the Holocaust of World War II, the movement for a
sovereign Jewish state was met with violent opposition from Arab nationalists. Id.
120. See BERNARD REICH, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISRAEL lv-lvi (1992).
121. See id. at lvi.
122. Israel captured from Egypt both the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip
in the summer of 1956, but eventually withdrew when United Nations peace-
keepers were deployed to the Suez Canal region. See id. at lvii.
123. Upon Egyptian President Nasser's call for the removal of United Nations
forces, Israel launched a preemptive strike which subsequently drew Jordan, Syria,
Iraq, and other Arab nations into the war. See id. at lvii-lviii. Israel's ultimate
victory resulted in its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Id.
124. Between February 1969 and August 1970, Egypt launched attacks against
Israeli forces at the Suez Canal, but agreed to accept a U.N. Security Council
Resolution devised by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers after the Soviet
Union began supporting Israel. See ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 117,
at 62-63.
125. In what came to be known as the "Yom Kippur War," Syria and Egypt
launched a surprise attack against Israel at its northern and southern borders. See
id. at 64. Israel was eventually able to drive the invading armies back into their
respective countries. See id. at 65. Israel entered into Syria and Egypt and
threatened to overtake Damascus and the Egyptian Army, thus provoking Soviet
intervention which prompted a cease fire negotiated by the United States. See id.
at 66.
126. Israel launched a major military action against the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) which was encamped in Lebanon in order to secure Israel's
northern border and destroy the PLO infrastructure. REICH, supra note 120, at
Ix. Although the border was secured and the PLO withdrew from Lebanon, Israeli
troops stationed in Lebanon were targeted for violent terrorist operations. ld
127. See Noemi Gal-Or, Countering Terrorism in Israel, in THE DEADLY SIN
OF TERRORISM 139 (David A. Charters ed., 1994) citing Gabriel Ben-Dor, The
Strategy of Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Case of Palestinian
Guerrillas, in TERRORISM, SURPRISE AND CONTROL 139 (Yair Evron ed., 1979).
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being, in a state of war, by supporting the activities of radical
groups.' 2s The recent peace movement has not been received
with, far-reaching support, especially from radical factions of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and organizations like
Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Nor has the Israeli government's
cooperation with the Palestinians been widely supported by Israeli
militants, as demonstrated by the assassination of Yitzak Rabin by
a radical Jewish student. Achieving a lasting peace in this region
will be a painstakingly long process that undoubtedly will be
challenged by both Israeli and Palestinian terrorists.
A. Insurgent Organizations
Until 1993, the PLO operated under the Palestine National
Charter" which explicitly states that the only way to liberate
Palestine is through armed struggle.130  The PLO, however, has
since agreed to assume responsibility for public order and security
in Gaza and Jericho, and to work toward preventing acts of
terrorism, crime, and other hostilities.131  This change in policy
was made possible by the September 13, 1993, Peace Accord
between the PLO and Israel, which "allow[ed] mutual recognition
and the eventual creation of an autonomous Palestinian govern-
ment under PLO auspices within the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
1 32
Prior to this peace agreement, groups affiliated with the PLO
pursued policies of terrorism designed to eradicate the Jewish State.
The A1-Fatah,133 formed by Palestinian exiles in Kuwait in 1957,
mounted border raids into Israel in 1965 and became the military
128. Id.
129. This Charter was adopted by the Palestine National Council of the PLO,
on July 17, 1968. See THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 136 (R. Lapidoth & M. Hirsch eds., 1992).
130. Id. at 137, art. 9.
131. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Cairo, May 4, 1994,
arts. VIII and XVIII (Government of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem).
132. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 109.
133. In addition to numerous attacks on civilian targets, different factions of Al-
Fatah, such as Black September, Force-17, and the Hawari Group, were
responsible for the assault on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, the
assassination of Jordan's Prime Minister, and the takeover and sabotage of several
embassies. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 12-13; ANDERSON &
SLOAN, supra note 1, at 113.
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arm of the PLO under the direction of Yassir Arafat in the late
1960s."M The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and an air raid
on the PLO's Tunisian headquarters in 1985, forced the Al-Fatah
to relocate in several Mid-East countries.3 ' Al-Fatah received
some diplomatic leverage when, in 1988, Arafat reiterated the
group's renunciation of terrorism and acknowledged Israel's right
to exist before the United Nations. 3 6  But this international
goodwill was damaged when Al-Fatah openly sided with Iraq
during the Gulf War. 37
Internal divisions over the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements
still plague the Popular Struggle Front (PSF),"38 which rejoined
the PLO in 1991 after suspending its membership in 1974.'3 The
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),14
which has always advocated the position that the formation of a
Palestinian state does not require the destruction of Israel, had
been coping with internal struggles and break-away factions prior
to the Peace Accord.141 The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP),142 whose inflexible Marxist ideology generated
134. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 12-13.
135. Id.
136. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 113.
137. Id.
138. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1995 61 (1996)
(hereinafter PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1995). After splitting from the
PLO, the PSF not only attacked Israeli and Arab targets, but PLO targets as well.
139. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 289. The PSF numbers around 300
members and, in addition to several notorious attacks in the 1970s and the
kidnapping of U.S. Army Colonel Ernest Morgan, it has claimed unconfirmed
responsibility for other attacks. Id.
140. An early break-away group from the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, the DFLP has been involved only in border raids since 1988, but was
responsible for the Ma'alot schoolhouse massacre in 1974, in which 27 children
were killed and 134 people were wounded. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM:
1994, supra note 16, at 37-38.
141. See Kenneth Katzman, TERRORISM: MIDDLE EASTERN GROUPS AND
STATE SPONSORS 15 (CRS Report for Congress, 1995). The DFLP split into two
factions in 1991. Id. The Hawatmeh faction opposes the Declaration of Principles
signed between the PLO and Israel in 1993 while the other faction is loyal to
Arafat. Id. The Hawatmeh faction, which has since suspended its membership in
the PLO, is now affiliated with ten other peace-rejectionist groups based in
Damascus. Id.
142. The PFLP was formed after the 1967 war and received its notoriety
through several ruthless hijackings and killings in the 1970s. TERRORIST GROUP
PROFILES, supra note 61, at 25-26. The PFLP was responsible for the bombings
of several civilian airliners and buses, was the force behind the Japanese Red
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
several internal disputes which led to the formation of other
terrorist organizations, such as the PFLP-General Command
(PFLP-GC) 43 and the Arab Organization of 15 May,'" has
suspended its participation in the PLO to continue a campaign of
violence.
141
A number of organizations not affiliated with the PLO
continue to support the violent eradication of Israel. The Hizbal-
lah,"4 which is primarily directed from Iran, 47 seeks to rid the
Lebanese region of all non-Islamic influences through a vigorous
campaign of terrorism.' 48 HAMAS, 149 a loosely-structured orga-
Arm's attack on Lod Airport, and has undertaken rocket, grenade, and knife
attacks against Israeli civilians. Id.
143. The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP to pursue the development of a
conventional military, as can be seen in numerous attacks utilizing hang-gliders,
hot air balloons, assault rifles, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets. The PFLP-
GC successfully engineered the release of 1150 Palestinian prisoners in exchange
for three Israeli soldiers. See id. at 26-27; PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM:
1995, supra note 138, at 60-61. The PFLP-GC's violent opposition to the PLO led
to a further split which established the foundation of the Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF). PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1995, supra note 138, at 58-59.
The PLF further split into pro-Libyan, pro-Syrian, and pro-PLO factions. Id. The
pro-PLO faction led by Abu Abbas is responsible for the attack on the cruise ship
Achille Lauro. Id. An arrest warrant for Abu Abbas is still outstanding in Italy.
Id.
144. The 15 May Organization, was formed in 1979 and has never been
affiliated with the PLO. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 16, at 8-9. It
disbanded in 1984 after several bombings of U.S. and Israeli targets. Id.
145. See Katzman, supra note 141, at 14-15.
146. Lebanese Shiite clerics who subscribe to the Islamic revolutionary ideology
of Ayatollah Khomeini founded the Hizballah after the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in 1982. Id. at 4-5. The organization's original goal was to form an
Islamic republic in Lebanon, but it has since concentrated its efforts on disrupting
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Id. The Hizballah is also trying to integrate
into the Lebanese political system and now holds eight of 128 seats in the national
assembly. Id.
147. Reports have indicated that Iranian diplomats posted in Lebanon, Syria,
and Sudan provide the Hizballah with logistical support. Iran is also reported to
finance the organization with $60 to $100 million per year. Id.
148. The Hizballah has conducted several notorious anti-Western attacks, such
as bombings of the U.S. Marine Barracks, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S.
Embassy annex in Beirut. Katzman, supra note 141, at 4-5. It is also responsible
for the hijacking of a TWA airliner, two Israeli-targeted bombings in Buenos
Aires, and the detention of Western hostages in Lebanon. Id.
149. HAMAS, which grew out of a Palestinian uprising in 1987, generally
opposes the peace process, but does appear to be willing to participate in the
newly formed Palestinian Authority which has resulted from the peace agreement.
Id. at 6. The organization has a military wing, known as the Izz ad-Din al Qassam
Brigades, but also engages in peaceful political activity, provides social services,
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nization that works primarily through mosques to recruit members,
raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda, has
become Al-Fatah's rival since its formation in 1987.150 Militant
factions of Hamas, whose strength is focused in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, have conducted many attacks against Israel civilian
and military targets, suspected Palestinian collaborators, and Al-
Fatah rivals."'1 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is actually a
cohesive group of several factions which advocate the creation of
an Islamic state and the destruction of Israel through holy war.'52
Because the PLO has not been able to successfully control these
fundamentalist groups, Israel will be forced to stay alert to
continued violence.
Palestinian groups, though a major threat, have recently been
overshadowed by the emergence of militant Jewish fundamentalists
who also seek to destroy the peace process. The assassination of
Yitzak Rabin by a radical Jewish student has forced Israel to re-
evaluate its policies on Jewish extremist groups.1 3  However,
even before Rabin's assassination, the extremist groups Kach"
and Kahane Chai'55 were declared to be terrorist organizations
after voicing support for a Kach affiliate who attacked an Islamic
supports charities, and finances education to needy Palestinians. Id.
150. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1994, supra note 16, at 41. The
number of hardcore members is unknown, but HAMAS has tens of thousands of
sympathizers who lend both political and financial support. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 53-54. In addition to bus attacks and cross-border raids against
Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the PI has threatened to
attack U.S. interests in both Jordan and Egypt due to its strong support of Israel.
Id.
153. Although Jewish extremists have used terrorism against Palestinian
civilians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli government has not been
swift in responding to the problem. See P. Marcus, The Treatment of Terrorists in
the Israeli Occupied Territories 3(2) AMER. U. J. INT'L. & POL'Y. 457 (1988) as
cited in Ruth Levush, Israel, in TERRORISM: FOREIGN/INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RESPONSES IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES 69, 70 (Report for Congress,
1995).
154. This organization was founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane who was
assassinated in the United States in 1990. Katzman, supra note 141, at 11.
Kahane was responsible for the creation of the Jewish Defense League in 1968,
which operated in the United States, primarily for the protection of Orthodox Jews
in New York City neighborhoods. See ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 169-
71. The Kach Party is an ultranationalist group favoring expulsion of the Arabs
from both Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Id.
155. Founded by Meir Kahane's son, Binyamin, this group split from the Kach
party following Meir Kahane's assassination. See Katzman, supra note 141, at 11.
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mosque. 56  Jewish extremists have proved to be a danger to a
peaceful coexistence with Palestinians and have now been brought
to the forefront of Israeli attention with Yitzak Rabin's assassina-
tion. 57
B. Antiterrorist Legislation in Israel
The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance,' which is only
applicable to internationally-recognized Israeli borders, Jerusa-
lem,159 and the Golan Heights,"6° was the first antiterrorist legis-
lation to be enacted by the state of Israel.16' The Ordinance has
no effect in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.62 It does not
define terrorism; rather, it describes a "terrorist organisation" as:
"a body of persons resorting in its activities to acts of violence
calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to threats of such
acts of violence."' 63 Supporting a terrorist organization is punish-
able by a maximum of three years imprisonment and a fine of one-
156. See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1995, supra note 138, at 51. A
Kach affiliate killed 40 people and wounded 150 people worshipping at a mosque
in Hebron on February 25, 1994. Katzman, supra note 141, at 11. These groups
have also claimed responsibility for several shootings in the West Bank and
Hebron. Id. Israel banned both groups on March 13, 1994 in an effort to stem the
furor caused by the Hebron massacre. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 172.
157. Jewish terrorist groups were not considered to be a threat to the Israeli
Defense Forces as of 1988. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 117, at 279-
80. The Gush Emunim Underground launched several terrorist operations against
Arab targets in the early 1980s. Id. Other smaller groups were responsible for
less notorious attacks. Id.
158. 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948). This Ordinance only applies during a state of
emergency as declared by § 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, 1
L.S.I. 7, (1948).
159. See Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, 1967,
21 L.S.I. 75, (1966-67); and Municipal Ordinance (Amendment No. 6) Law, 1967,
21 L.S.I. 75-76, (1967), as cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 72.
160. See Golan Heights Law, 1981, 36 L.S.I 7, (1981-82), as cited in Levush,
supra note 153, at 72.
161. The Ordinance was enacted after the assassination of United Nations
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. Noemi Gal-Or, Countering Terrorism in Israel,
in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM 137, 149 (David A. Charters ed., 1994).
Although its intention was to eradicate domestic Jewish terrorism, the Ordinance
also applies to foreign terrorism. Id.
162. Levush, supra note 153, at 72. These territories were never officially
annexed by Israel and military regulations apply to all people living within their
jurisdictions; however, for common offenses, Jordanian law applies to the West
Bank, Egyptian law applies to the Gaza Strip, and Israeli law applies to all of
Israel. Id.
163. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948), § 1.
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thousand pounds,"6 membership in a terrorist organization is an
offense warranting a maximum prison sentence of five years,
161
and activity in a terrorist organization is subjected to a maximum
term of twenty years imprisonment. 66
The Ordinance requires that the government post notice in the
Official Gazette stating that a particular group has been designated
a terrorist organization. 67 If no such notice has been posted, the
government must prove that one or more of a group's members is
responsible for acts or threats of violence on behalf of or by order
of the organization, or that one or more of a group's members
claimed responsibility for acts or threats of violence on behalf of or
by order of the organization."6 An organization's property may
also be confiscated by order of a district court in response to a
request by the Inspector General.169 The Inspector General is
164. Id. at § 4. A person who supports a terrorist organization: a) publishes,
in writing or orally, words of praise, sympathy or encouragement for acts of
violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or for threats of such acts
of violence; or b) calls for aid or support for acts of violence calculated to cause
death or injury or threat of such; c) possesses propaganda materials; d) gives
money or money's worth for the benefit of a terrorist organisation; e) puts a place
at the disposal of a terrorist organisation as a place of action, meeting, propagan-
da, or storage; or f) puts an article at the disposal of a terrorist organisation. Id.
Israel passed the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Law, 1980,34 L.S.I. 211,
(1980), which adds: g) identifies with or supports a terrorist organization in a
public place.
165. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948), § 1.
"'[M]ember of a terrorist organisation' means a person belonging to it and includes
a person participating in its activities, publishing propaganda in favour of a
terrorist organisation or its activities or aims, or collecting moneys or articles for
the benefit of a terrorist organisation or its activities." Id.
166. Id. at § 2. This offense includes:
performing a function in the management or instruction of a
terrorist organisation or participating in the deliberations or the
framing of the decisions of a terrorist organisation or acting as
a member of a tribunal of a terrorist organisation or delivering
a propaganda speech at a public meeting or over the wireless on
behalf of a terrorist organisation.
Id.
167. Id. at § 8. In any legal proceeding, such notice serves as proof that the
posted body of persons is a terrorist organisation unless the contrary is proven.
Id. Furthermore, a final judgment which determines that a body of persons is a
terrorist organization can be used as prima facie evidence that the group is a
terrorist organization in any other legal proceeding. Id. at § 11(a).
168. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948), § 7; see
also Levush, supra note 153, at 75.
169. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948), § 5; see
also Levush, supra note 153, at 74.
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further authorized to close any facility that serves a terrorist
organization or its members. 70
The Penal Law171 can also be applied to offenses committed
in the course of a terrorist attack. Because offenses against the
person, such as causing death or endangering life and health, are
not excused if the offense is committed in connection with a
political or religious motive, the Penal Law is equally applicable to
terrorist activity.172 Capital punishment may not be requested for
regular offenses, but military courts are given the option of
imposing the death penalty.173  There are also special provisions
in the Penal Law addressing unlawful associations and assemblies
that supplement the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance."
Certain provisions also provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over
170. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948), § 6(a). A
property owner affected by such an action may appeal to a district court within
fifteen days of receiving knowledge of the shut down. Id. at § 6(b).
171. LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL VOLUME, 5737-1977, as cited
in Levush, supra note 153, at 72.
172. Id.
173. The death penalty has only been implemented in the Adolf Eichmann war
crimes case. Levush, supra note 153, at 73.
174. Penal Law, 5737-1977, art. 2, reprinted in Levush, supra note 153, at 73,
states:
(1) any body of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, which
by its constitution or propaganda or otherwise advocates, incites
or encourages any of the following unlawful acts:
(a) the subversion of the political order of Israel by
revolution or sabotage;
(b) the overthrow by force or violence of the lawful
government of Israel or of any other state, or of
organized government;
(c) the destruction or injury of property of the State
or of property used in commerce within the State or
with other countries.
1997]
436 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2
offenses against humanity,175 offenses against the state,176 and
offenses causing injury to nationals or residents of Israel.
177
Upon conquering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967,
the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces issued the Proclama-
tion on Law and Administration, 78 which declared that the
British Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945,79
which had been maintained by previous occupiers, would remain in
force. The Defence (Emergency) Regulations list various terrorist
offenses that fall under the title of Unlawful Associations and
warrant a fine and imprisonment of one to ten years.80 Unlike
the domestic laws of Israel, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
grant the military far-reaching powers, such as administrative
175. Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 4, as cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 76-77.
176. Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 5(a), reprinted in Levush, supra note 153, at 77,
states:
The courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law a
person who committed abroad an act which would have been an
offense had it been committed in Israel and which injured or
was intended to injure the State of Israel, its security, property
or economy or its transport or communication links with other
countries.
Id.
177. Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 7(a), reprinted in Levush, supra note 153, at 77,
states:
The courts in Israel shall be competent to try under Israeli Law
a person who committed abroad an act which would have been
an offense had it been committed in Israel and which injured or
was intended to injure the life, person, health, freedom or
property of an Israeli national or resident of Israel.
Id.
178. M. SHAMGAR, MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINIS-
TERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, THE LEGAL ASPEcrs 450 (1982), as cited in Levush,
supra note 153, at 75, states:
The law in existence in the Region on June 7, 1967, shall
remain in force, insofar as it does not in any way conflict with
the provisions of this Proclamation or any Proclamation or
Order which may be issued by me, and subject to modifications
resulting from the establishment of government by the Israel
Defense Forces in the Region.
Id.
179. Government of Palestine, The Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945,
as amended until Mar. 2, 1947, as cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 75.
180. See British Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, arts. 84 and
85. With regard to unlawful associations, memberships, management, holding
office, and working for the association is prohibited; in addition, to affording a
meeting place, fundraising, and publishing or distributing materials is impermis-
sible. Levush, supra note 153, at 76.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
detention, travel restrictions, expulsions, and the demolition of a
residence known to belong to a terrorist. '81
In addition to these principal laws, Israel has also enacted
specific laws to aid in the state's plan of terrorism counteraction.
The Explosives Law1" forbids the manufacture, trade, and
transport of explosives without a permit granted by an authorized
government Minister.l8 3  The Extradition Law"8  provides for
the extradition of an individual from Israel to another state except
in cases where the substantive offense is political in character '85
or if the offender is an Israeli citizen."8 6 Under the Law of Re-
turn18 an immigrant may be denied a visa if the Minister of the
Interior determines that the individual has engaged in an activity
directed against the Jewish people, may endanger public health,
public safety, or state security,'88 or has a criminal past and is
181. R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW, ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 184
(1985) as cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 76.
182. Explosives Law, 1953, 8 L.S.I. 57, (1953-54) as cited in Levush, supra note
153, at 77.
183. Levush, supra note 153, at 78. Israel does not have any specific regulations
regarding nuclear materials even though it is speculated that it will have nuclear
capabilities in the near future. Id.
184. Extradition Law, 1954, 8 L.S.I. 144 (1953-54), reprinted in Levush, supra
note 153, at 78. Section 2 states that an individual may be extradited if:
(1) An agreement providing for reciprocity as to the extradi-
tion of offenders exists between Israel and the state requesting
his extradition...
(2) he is accused or has been convicted in the requesting state
of an offense of a non-political character and which, had it been
committed in Israel, would be one of the offenses set out in the
Schedule to this Law.
Id.
185. An example can be found in Nakash v. State of Israel, 40(4) P.D. 78, in
which the appellant argued that his murder of an Arab night club owner in France
was of a political character since it was in response to the French authorities'
failure to adequately protect Jews from attacks organized by Arab organizations.
Levush, supra note 153, at 78. The court authorized the extradition because the
substance of the offense was not political in nature and held that the subjective
motives of the appellant were irrelevant. Id.
186. 8 DINIM (Laws) 4733 (1991-), cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 78. A
citizen will be extradited if he or she committed the offense before acquiring
Israeli citizenship. Id.
187. Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I 114, (1950), reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 156 (Joseph Badi ed., 1961).
188. Id.
19971
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likely to endanger public welfare.189 Furthermore, deportation is
only permissible with regard to an individual who is in Israel
without a permit of residence.19°
The most striking Israeli legislation is that concerning assis-
tance to victims of terrorism. Pensions will be granted to citizens
who are injured by acts of terrorism within the state and
abroad,19 as is true of visa and permit holders who are injured by
acts of terrorism within the state and areas controlled by the Israeli
Defense Forces.192 Israel will also provide victims of terrorism
with funeral expenses,19 medical expenses,194 and subsidies for
vocational education, health insurance, and guaranteed loans. 5
C. Observations
Israel's experience with terrorism bears resemblance to that of
the United Kingdom in that it has grown from centuries of religious
and cultural turmoil. The Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is a
significant step toward ending disputes over geographic boundaries
that have been the subject of numerous terrorist attacks, but the
social strife inherent in the region will continue to plague any peace
accord. Those who do press for further compromise will be not
only challenged by radical terrorist organizations, but will also face
resistance from militant civilians and communities that are
ingrained with a hatred that will not diminish in their lifetimes.
The Netanyahu administration is now facing these obstacles. Like
Northern Ireland, Israel will not be able to enact legislation that
will quell the enmity that has been the driving force behind
189. Law of Return (Amendment), 1954, 8 L.S.I. 144, (1954), reprinted in
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 332 (Joseph Badi ed., 1961).
190. Entry into Israel Law, 1952, as amended, 6 L.S.I. 161 (1951-52), cited in
Levush, supra note 153, at 79. An individual will not be deported if they are an
Israeli national or if they are in possession of an immigrant visa granted under the
Law of Return, 5710-1950. Id.
191. See Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 1970, 24 L.S.I. 131 (1969-
70), cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 79.
192. See Pensions for Victims of Hostile Actions (Definition of Area Held by
the Israel Defense Forces), 1971, 31 DINIM 20409 (1993- ), cited in Levush, supra
note 153, at 79.
193. See Victims of Hostile Action (Burial Expenses) Regulations, 1978, 31
DINIM 20385 (1993- ), cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 79.
194. See Victims of Hostile Action (Burial Expenses) Regulations, 1978, 31
DINIM 20395 (1993- ), cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 79.
195. See Victims of Hostile Action (Burial Expenses) Regulations, 1978, 31
DINIM 20399 (1993- ), cited in Levush, supra note 153, at 79.
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terrorist violence in Israel. Unless Israelis and Palestinians can
control their mutual animosity, current peace efforts will be in vain
and terrorism will continue to afflict the region. The next century
will be instrumental in healing ancient wounds that have compelled
the terrorist violence of past decades.
V. Japan
Japan's antiterrorist policies have their foundation in statutory
laws that date back to the late nineteenth century. However, it was
sizable Communist-inspired demonstrations, many of which
culminated in riotous disorders in the early 1950s, that brought the
issue of terrorism before the legislature.196 Unlike the United
Kingdom and Israel, Japan has not experienced terrorism on an
extensive scale. For this reason, Japan has adopted a practice of
enacting antiterrorism legislation ex post facto. However, recent
developments may compel Japan to enact initiatives that uniformly
address the problem of terrorism.
A. Insurgent Organizations in Japan
The Japanese Red Army (JRA)1 97 is comprised of a small
number of former student activists who now operate in conjunction
with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley."8  The group is believed to have
196. Sung Yoon Cho, Japan, in TERRORISM: FOREIGN/INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RESPONSES IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES 89, 97 (Report for Congress,
1995).
197. The JRA wishes to incite a world-wide Marxist-Leninist revolution by
uniting leftist Japanese forces to eliminate imperialism and establish a "People's
Republic" in Japan. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 118.
198. See TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 170-85 (Peter Janke ed. 1992). The
origins of the JRA are found in the Sekigun-Ha, a militant student group
organized in 1969, which disbanded when the police detected plans to overtake the
official residence of the Prime Minister. Id. at 172. Fifty-four members were
arrested, and the remaining members, in search of international support, hijacked
JAL flight Yodo-Go on March 31, 1970, and forced it to fly to North Korea. Id.
at 175. However, the North Korean government restricted the group from
conducting any activities and forced the hijackers to remain in North Korea until
the late 1980s. Id. at 176. Soon after the hijacking, the Japanese police arrested
200 people in efforts to suppress the remainder of the group, but when Fusako
Shigenobu was released from prison, she left Japan with a small number of
followers. Id. They traveled to Lebanon were they reorganized as the Arab Red
Army in order to gain strength as a faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, but soon changed their name to the Japanese Red Army. Id.
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between twenty and thirty hard-core members encamped in
Lebanon and a financial support base of 100-150 in Japan.1
Financial assistance is mainly provided by the PFLP, other
Palestinian terrorist groups, and Libya.2° The most infamous of
the JRA's activities was the 1972 attack of Lod Airport in
Israel,2 1 and the takeover of the American embassy in Kuala
Lumpur.2 2 The group's activity subsided in 1977, but its mem-
bers re-emerged in 1986 in connection with other Asian terrorist
organizations. 23 However, group fragmentation, apathy, and
police arrests have severely limited the organization's activities.
The Chukaku-Ha,2°  comprised of approximately 3500
members, a political party, and a covert action wing (the Kansai
Revolutionary Army),2 ' is the largest and most powerful of
199. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 118.
200. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1994, supra note 16, at 44.
201. See TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 198, at 176-77. Three
members, while still under the name of the Arab Red Army, attacked passengers
with machine guns and grenades on May 30, 1972. Id. at 176. Twenty-four people
were killed, many of whom were on a religious pilgrimage from Puerto Rico, and
two of the terrorists committed suicide in the process. Id. at 177. The third
member, Kozo Okamoto, was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment, but
was released along with 1150 Palestinian guerrillas in exchange for three Israeli
soldiers held by the PFLP in 1985. Id. The purpose of this attack, though
believed to have been to prove the JRA's loyalty to the PFLP, is still unknown.
Id. at 176. See WILLIAM A. FARRELL, BLOOD AND RAGE: THE STORY OF THE
JAPANESE RED ARMY 138-44 (1990) for a detailed account of the Lod Airport
Massacre.
202. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 119. In August of 1975,
ten members took over the U.S. Consulate in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and took
52 people hostage. Id. The terrorists demanded that seven JRA members be set
free from Japanese prisons and transported to the Middle East. Id. Although
Japan intended to release all seven JRA members, only five expressed willingness
and were transported to Tripoli, Libya, via Kuala Lumpur. Id. The Japanese
government later released nine imprisoned terrorists and paid six million dollars
in exchange for 159 people taken hostage when the JRA hijacked a Japan Airlines
plane in Bombay and forced it to land in Dhaka, Bangladesh in 1977. Id. Upon
the release and payment, the hijackers were flown to Algeria. Id.
203. See TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 198, at 182-83. Evidence
revealed that JRA members were believed to be behind the formation and
subsequent activities of the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade and the Anti-
war Democratic Front. Id.
204. Also known as the Middle Core or Nucleus Faction, this organization
wants to terminate the current constitutional democracy in Japan, the monarchy,
and United States-Japanese relations. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note
61, at 115.
205. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1995, supra note 138, at 44.
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several ultra-leftist factions.20 6 Funds derived from membership
dues, sale of the Zenshin newspaper, and fundraising campaigns are
channelled to support 200 core members who have no other source
of income.217 The Chukaku-Ha's attacks, usually conducted with
crude rockets, incendiary devices, and flamethrowers, 20 8 are
:targeted at property damage rather than human casualties.
2°
.Within the past year, the Aum Shinrikyo (Cult of the Supreme
Truth) has been designated as a "violence-prone organization.
' 210
The cult, comprised of 10,000 members in Japan'1 is most notori-
ous for its gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system.212 The cult
has also been held responsible for other crimes, including murder,
kidnappings, illegal weapons manufacture, torture, and child
abuse.213  The cult's guru, Asahara Shokou, along with 100
members, have since been arrested.214
206. ANDERSON & SLOAN, supra note 1, at 66-67. It is the largest and most
militant of 23 factions that make up the Japanese New Left movement. Id. The
group also rejects the "Japanese corporate state" as evidenced by "frequent
attacks on the construction of the New Tokyo International Airport and against
the subway and railroad mass-transit systems." Id.
207. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 116.
208. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1994, supra note 16, at 37.
209. See TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 61, at 117. The group has
been linked to the beating death of a railway trade union official in September of
1986, but other attacks have not produced human casualties. Id. For example,
truck-mounted flamethrowers have been used to burn buildings, bombs have
destroyed homes of executives and have been used to delay construction of the
expanding Narita airport, and rocket-bombs and projectiles have been fired at
targets such as the Imperial Palace and airports. Id
210. Cho, supra note 196, at 98.
211. Master of Terror, ASIAWEEK, Dec. 22, 1995 / Dec. 29, 1995, at 43; available
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ASIAWK File. In addition to its Japanese contingent,
the cult also claims to have 100,000 member overseas, primarily in Moscow, but
also in New York, Bonn, and Colombo. Id.
212. See Steven R. Bowman, Chemical Agent Attacks in Japan, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS May 4, 1995. In June of 1994, seven people were killed by a
release of Sarin Gas in the cult's home town of Matsumoto. Id. On March 5,
1995, nineteen passengers on the Yokohama subway were hospitalized for eye and
respiratory pain from. unidentified fumes. Id. The most lethal attack came on
March 20, 1995, when Sarin leaked from packages placed aboard five cars in
Tokyo's subway system which killed 12 people and injured more than 5000. Id.
One month later, April 19, 1995, 400 people were hospitalized following a "copy-
cat" attack with tear gas. Id.
213. Master of Terror, supra note 211, at 43.
214. Id. Shokou's trial began in early May and could continue for another five
years. Trial of the Century, ASIAWEEK, May 10, 1996, at 7; available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, ASIAWK File. In addition to the Japanese trial, a Russian court
has ordered the cult to pay $4 million to families of cult members. Justice for All,
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B. Antiterrorism Legislation
The basic foundation for terrorism counteraction in Japan can
be found within the Criminal Code of 1907.215 Under the Code,
crimes such as insurrection, homicide, assault, kidnapping, destruc-
tion of property, and rioting216 can be prosecuted as acts of
terrorism.217 Furthermore, the Code's extraterritorial jurisdiction
provisions, which were revised in 1987,218 can also be used to
bring acts of terrorism committed abroad within the jurisdiction of
Japanese courts. 219 Although the Code is applicable to the basic
common crimes inherent in terrorism, Japan has found it necessary
to enact additional legislation to enhance its terrorism counterac-
tion policy.
ASIAWEEK, April 28, 1995; available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ASIAWK File.
This money is to be used to build a rehabilitation center for brainwashed cult
members. Id.
215. Law No. 45 of 1907, amended by Law No. 31 of 1991, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 89.
216. Id. at 90. Generally, a person is guilty of rioting under the Code if he
assembles in a crowd for the purpose of using violence or intimidation (art. 106);
however, rioting will be prosecuted as a terrorist offense if two or more people
assemble for purposes of jointly causing injury to life, limb, or property (art. 208-
2). Id. at 92. These assembly provisions also have been supplemented by the Law
Concerning Punishment of Violent Acts, Law No. 60 of 1926, amended by Law
No. 31 of 1991, arts. 5-7., which enhance the Code provisions to aggravated
offenses which carry a maximum punishment of ten years of penal servitude. Id.
217. See Cho, supra note 196, at 90. Additionally, attempts and conspiracies to
commit such crimes also fall under the Code's terrorism provisions. Id.
218. Under revised art. 4-2,,if a crime observed by an international convention
corresponds to a provision of the Criminal Code, Japan is obligated to punish
anyone who commits the crime outside of the country. See K. Itoh, The 1987
Penal Code and Other Special Criminal Amendments Law: A Response to the Two
UN Conventions Against International Terrorism 32 JAP. ANN. INT'L. 18 (1989),
cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 95.
219. Cho,,supra note 196, at 94. Art. 1, § 2, grants jurisdiction over anyone
who "commits a crime on board a Japanese vessel or a Japanese aircraft outside
Japan." Id. Art. 2 grants jurisdiction over anyone who commits a designated
crime (insurrection, counterfeiting, and forgery of public documents) that threatens
Japan. Id. Art. 3 grants jurisdiction over any Japanese national who commits a
designated major crime (murder, bodily injury, kidnapping, and arson) outside of
the country. Id. Finally, Art. 4 grants jurisdiction over any Japanese public
official who is guilty of official corruption or drafting false official documents
outside of Japan. Id.
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Following World War II, Japan enacted the Subversive
Activities Prevention Law of 1952220 to control the activities of
the Japanese Communist Party.221 Even though suppression of
the Communist Party was this law's original purpose, it can be
utilized to suppress any terrorist organization.222 Common
crimes23 normally addressed under the Criminal Code will be
prosecuted under the Subversive Activities Prevention Law if
committed with an objective of "the promotion or support of or
opposition to any political doctrines or policy. '24 Additionally,
the Subversive Activities Prevention Law will also be applied to
treasonable offenses which the Criminal Code designates as
subversive activities per se.225 However, to be prosecuted under
the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, a defendant must be
affiliated with a subversive organization; otherwise he or she will
face normal criminal proceedings under the Criminal Code.226
An organization's members who are convicted under the
provisions of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law are subject
to a maximum of seven years imprisonment or penal servitude.227
The organization itself can be completely dissolved or be restricted
220. Law No. 240 of 1952, amended by Law No. 89 of 1993, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 89.
221. See John M. Maki, Japan's Subversive Activities Prevention Law, VI W.
POL. Q. 489-92 (1953).
222. Subversive Activities Prevention Law, Law No. 240 of 1952, amended by
Law No. 89 of 1993, art. 1, reprinted in Cho, supra note 196, at 91, states that the
law's purpose is:
[T]o contribute to the preservation of public safety by establish-
ing regulatory procedures for taking action against organizations
which have carried out terroristic activities as organizational
activities and supplementing the Criminal Code with additional
penalties.
Id.
223. Such crimes are riot, arson, the setting off and use of explosives,
endangering the passage of or wrecking public conveyances, murder, robbery,
interference in the exercise of duties and coercion of public officials. Maki, supra
note 221, at 493.
224. Id., citing art. 4, § 1, 1 B.
225. Cho, supra note 196, at 91. Subversive activities per se are crimes related
to insurrection and treason, such as inducement of foreign aggression, and
providing assistance to enemies. Maki, supra note 22, at 492-93.
226. Cho, supra note 196, at 91.
227. ' Subversive Activities Prevention Law, Law No. 240 of 1952, amended by
Law No. 89 of 1993, art.38, 1, construed in Cho, supra note 196, at 91.
1997]
444 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2
from engaging in specific activities for a specified length of
time.22 The Public Security Investigation Agency may designate
an organization as a danger and appropriate for surveillance and
investigation, and may also request that the Public Security
Commission dissolve the organization entirely.229The Subversive Activities Prevention Law has not been'
without controversy. Arguments have been made, albeit unsuccess-
fully, that it infringes upon the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech,23 and critics have warned against possible infringement
of the right to freedom of religion. 1  Demonstrators arrested
during disturbances in the 1960s and 1970s were commonly tried
under the riot provisions of the Criminal Code instead of the
Subversive Activities Prevention Law. 32  The language of the
Subversive Activities Prevention Law limits its application to
situations in which there is a danger that the group will continue to
repeat subversive activity in the future, and even then it will be
applied "only within the minimum extent necessary to assure the
228. Subversive Activities Prevention Law, Law No. 240 of 1952, amended by
Law No. 89 of 1993, arts. 5-7, construed in Cho, supra note 196, at 92.
229. Cho, supra note 196, at 97. Sixteen groups have been targeted for
surveillance and investigation under the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, but
none have been dissolved. Id.
230. Cho, supra note 196, at 93. In four separate cases, members of the
Communist Party were indicted on charges of printing and distributing Communist
literature in violation of art. 38, 2, but challenged the Law's constitutionality as
in violation of Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution. Id. Although the
defendants were ultimately acquitted on other grounds, the constitutionality of the
Act was upheld by the lower courts, three of which were affirmed by the Japanese
Supreme Court. Id., citing the Gifu Case, 396 HANREI JIHO 19 (1959)(affirmed
by the Supreme Court, Dec. 21, 1964); Tsu and Kyoto Cases, 496 HANREI JIHO
69 (1967)(affirmed by Supreme Court, July 20, 1967, and Sept. 22, 1967,
respectively); and the Kushiro Case, 74 HANREI JIHO 21 (1956)(affirmed by the
Sapporo High Court, Mar. 30, 1956).
231. Cho, supra note 196, at 98. The Aum Shinrikyo, which has been
designated as a violence-prone organization, has been subjected to the Subversive
Activities Prevention Law. Id. Critics have asserted that putting a religious
organization under surveillance could be a violation of the Japanese Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of religion. Id.
232. Id. at 97. However, eight members of an ultra-nationalistic organization
were indicted on charges of preparation of homicide and incitement to riot in
violation of Articles 39 and 40 of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law. See
603 HANREI JIHO 94 (1970), cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 93-94.
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public safety." 3  To many critics, it appears that the Subversive
Activities Prevention Law has been largely ineffective.234
Japan has further attempted to curtail the activities of
subversive organizations, mainly the Japanese Mafia, through the
enactment of the Law Preventing Illegal Activities by Members of
Underground Organizations." A group usually will be designa-
ted an underworld organization if its members have extensive
criminal records. 36 This being the case, they will be banned from
engaging in a number of specified activities.
237
In the absence of an extradition treaty with a nation, 8
foreign terrorists can be extradited under the Law for the Extradi-
tion of Fugitive Criminals, 9 except in cases of a political na-
ture.2'° In this respect, an immigrant who is determined by the
Minister of Justice to be a danger to the public peace or national
interest can be deported under the Immigration Control and
Refugee Recognition Law.
241
Japan has also countered the threat of terrorism by passing
laws that restrict the use of explosives and nuclear materials. The
233. Subversive Activities Prevention Law, Law No. 240 of 1952, amended by
Law No. 89 of 1993, art. 2, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 91.
234. Cho, supra note 196, at 97.
235. Law No. 77 of 1991, amended by Law No. 89 of 1993, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 93.
236. Cho, supra note 196, at 93.
237. The ban covers activities ranging from terroristic threats to extorting
protection money. Id. at 93. Engaging in a banned activity can result in one
year's imprisonment and a fine of up to one million yen. Id.
238. An example is the extradition treaty between Japan and the United States
that entered into force on May 26, 1980. Treaty on Extradition, May 26, 1980,
U.S.-Japan, 31 UST 892, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 96.
239. Law No. 68 of 1953, amended by Law No. 89 of 1993, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 96.
240. Id. An example is a case in which a Chinese national hijacked a Chinese
aircraft flying from Bejing to New York and forced it to land at Fukuoka Airport
in Japan on December 16, 1989. Y. Kiyoshi, Political Offenses and Hijacking with
the Japanese Law for the Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, 34 JAP. ANN. INT'L
L. 69 (1991), construed in Cho, supra note 196, at 96. The terrorist claimed he was
fleeing from arrest due to his involvement in the Tianamen Square demonstration,
but it was revealed in court that he had actually been arrested for embezzlement.
Id. Because this was not a political offense, the terrorist was extradited to China
on April 24, 1990. Id.
241. Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended by Law No. 94 of 1991, cited in
Cho, supra note 196, at 97.
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Explosives Decree of 1884242 was revised in 1918 to supplement
the Criminal Code with heavier penalties. 24a However, milder
penalties have been instituted for the manufacture, sale, and import
of explosives without permission under the Law Concerning the
Control of Explosives and Similar Substances. 24  Japan enacted
additional legislation to control explosives in 1972 with the Law for
Punishment for the Use of Glass-Bottle Grenades245 which makes
the use, possession, or manufacture of gasoline bombs a criminal
offense.24  In 1988, Japan amended the Law for Control of
Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors
247
to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material.24
Most recently, Japan passed the Law Concerning the Preven-
tion of Bodily Harm Caused by Sarin Gas249 in response to a
242. Decree of the Dajokan, Law No. 3 of 1884, amended by Law No. 34 of
1918, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 89.
243. The amended Decree provided for the death penalty, penal servitude, or
seven years to life incarceration. Id.
244. Violations could result in a sentence of penal servitude not exceeding three
years and fines not exceeding one million yen Law No. 290 of 1950, amended by
Law No. 89 of 1993, art. 58, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 92.
245. Law No. 17 of 1974, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 92. Anyone who
endangers another's life or property through the use of a gasoline bomb is subject
to a sentence of up to seven years of penal servitude whereas anyone charged with
the possession or manufacture of a gasoline bomb can be fined up to 100,000 yen
or sentenced to up to three years of penal servitude. Id.
246. Cho, supra note 196, at 89. This legislation was passed in response to the
"Molotov cocktail struggle" in which mass protests and demonstrations were
inspired by left-wing student organizations and radical elements from various labor
unions. Id.
247. Law No. 166 of 1957, amended by Law No. 89 of 1993, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 95-96. This revision incorporated new articles to make it an offense
for any person to handle specified nuclear material without authority, to cause
death, injury, or damage to property with a fission chain reaction or by diffusing
radiation. Cho, supra note 196, at 96. Anyone guilty of such an offense or even
attempting such an offense can be sentenced to penal servitude of up to ten years.
Id. Any person who threatens to harm life, limb, or destroy property with nuclear
material, or who demands that others not perform their duties or refrain from
exercising their rights by threatening to steal nuclear material is subject to a
minimum of three years penal servitude. Id.
248. See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS,
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS 510 Comm. Print 1991,
cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 95.
249. Cho, supra note 196, at 93. The Law Concerning the Prevention of Bodily
Harm Caused by Sain Gas was enacted on April 19, 1995. Id.
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number of terrorist attacks undertaken by Aum Shinrikyo.25 ° The
use of Sarin or other lethal chemicals warrants a maximum penalty
of penal servitude for life25' while production or possession
carries a sentence of penal servitude of up to seven years.252
Furthermore, Japan has been active in subscribing to the
resolutions of various international conventions. In recognition of
the 1970 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft253 and the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation,2"4 Japan enacted
the Law Concerning Punishment for Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
and Similar Crimes255 and the Law Concerning Punishment of
Activities Endangering Aircraft. 26  Japan also has ratified the
1973 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents257 and the 1979 International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages" by enacting the Law Concerning Punish-
ment for Hostage-Taking7 9
C Observations
As can be seen, Japan has enacted legislation to address
specific terrorist threats rather than a uniform act to counter
terrorism. Japan's current experiences with terrorist organizations
250. Id. at 94. Police raids of the cult's facilities have revealed large quantities
of chemicals necessary for the production of Sarin gas as well as gun parts and
machinery. Id.
251. The Law Concerning Prevention of Bodily Harm Caused by Sarin Gas,
Art. 5, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 93.
252. The Law Concerning the Prevention of Bodily Harm Caused by Sarin Gas,
Art. 3, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 93.
253. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970,
U.S.-Japan, 22 UST 1641, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 95.
254. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil
Aviation, 24 UST 567, cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 95.
255. Law No. 68 of 1970, amended by Law No. 48 of 1978, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 90.
256. Law No. 87 of 1984, amended by Law No. 82 of 1977, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 90.
257. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 UST 1975,
cited in Cho, supra note 196, at 95.
258. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS,
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS, supra note 248, at 510.
259. Law No. 48 of 1978, amended by Law No. 52 of 1987, cited in Cho, supra
note 196, at 90.
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can be addressed by either the Subversive Activities Prevention
Law or the Criminal Code for prosecution. However, it appears
that Japan will continue to enact specific legislation that directly
addresses immediate threats, will subscribe to international
conventions, and will rely upon the Criminal Code for enforcement
of its antiterrorist policies. As long as such practices ,are effective
in combatting future threats of terrorism, it would be unnecessary
for Japan to expand in new directions.
VI. Conclusion
The antiterrorism legislation of the United Kingdom, Israel,
and Japan has been seasoned by regional phenomena. In this
respect, it is easy to dismiss each law as distinctively influenced.
However, terrorist violence is an adhesive that will continue to
bond each nation's current initiatives. The United'Kingdom and
Israel hold in common a territorial struggle seared by centuries of
religious and cultural turmoil. Japan, though not troubled by the
same degree of religious strife, has been the target of violent leftist
political campaigns which have conceived a legislative response of
similar effect. Each nation has criminalized the implements of
terrorism through uniform and specific legislation. Furthermore,
each nation has enacted legislation which prohibits the existence of
the principle organizations responsible for terrorism. The efforts
of all three nations are unique in framework, but analogous in
essence.
The United Kingdom's quandary may only be resolved with
independence for Northern Ireland. However, this is an unlikely
option. Furthermore, independence will not ameliorate the religious
schism in the population; the struggle will continue regardless of
sovereignty. Negotiations between the British government and the
IRA may curb the violence from a political perspective, but it will
do little to improve relations between Catholics and Protestants.
Therefore, the United Kingdom will have to look to the law to
control further violence. However, legislation cannot extinguish the
prejudices that continue to fuel the violence to which Northern
Ireland has become accustomed. It is not only the terrorists who
are instilled with animosity, but the population itself. Therefore,
the PTA and the EPA will do little to solve the dilemma and
continue to be criticized as meager means to an unattainable end.
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The situation in Israel is comparable to that of the United
Kingdom, but current political themes appear to be somewhat
effective in pacifying the region's violent tendencies. What has now
surfaced is a wave of violence aimed at corrupting the process of
compromise. Like Northern Ireland, legislation will not be able to
eradicate the abhorrence that is uniformly embraced by the
opposing cultures occupying the region. As the Israeli military
begins to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank will hopefully be able to relax the emergency
measures that have been necessary to this day. However, the
Jewish population that remains will still be militant, as will the
Palestinians who both passively and actively support the Islamic
campaign of terrorism. The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
and the Defence (Emergency) Provisions mirror the British
initiatives in form and substance. Although these laws have
accomplished their basic purposes, it is naive to consider them
solutions to the problem of terrorism. Each nation will continue to
develop policies to supplement the tattered legislation that has
valiantly attempted to prevent violent protest.
Unlike Northern Ireland and Israel, Japan enjoys an existence
devoid of the everyday apprehension of impending violence. In
this respect, it has been possible for Japan to rely upon its uniform
Criminal Code to address terrorist infractions. The Subversive
Activities Prevention Law has not been utilized to the same degree
as the Criminal Code, and it is unlikely it will do so in the future.
Japanese Leftist groups may very well pass from existence now that
Communism's influence is dissipating from the global panorama.
Furthermore, the Japanese Red Army has been effectively
excluded from the country and is beginning to deteriorate as a
major terrorist threat. Japan has been successful in controlling its
national security with initiatives that criminalize behavior that
sporadically erupts into violence. It is unlikely that Japan will ever
have to undergo the legislative transformations attributable to
Israel and the United Kingdom.
Terrorism will undoubtedly vex the international community
as it progresses into the next century; however, the legislative
initiatives of nations like the United Kingdom, Israel, and Japan
have significantly contributed to a global condemnation of
terrorism. Advances in policy management, target security, and
tactical responses have also curtailed the threat of terrorist activity.
A firm antiterrorist policy is in the best interest of most every
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nation, but its measures should create an environment hostile to
terrorist behavior, not a system that hinders the daily operations of
the general public. A nation's citizens should realize the extent of
contemporary society's vulnerability and be willing to make
concessions to successfully implement terrorism counteraction
policies. However, incessant paranoia and initiatives that reach far
beyond the relative threats posed by contemporary terrorists will
only work against the status quo. If the global community does not
observe this balance, society will be altered, and the terrorist will
have triumphed.
Matthew H. James
